This book examines the critical reception of Dewey’s pragmatic philosophy by six prominent analytic philosophers and relates it to the contested history of analytic philosophy and Deweyan pragmatism. It argues that analytic philosophers’ critical reception of Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy has, from the very beginning, been marred by externalist readings that do not engage with Dewey’s thinking from the inside, and suggests that this throws doubt upon the new revisionary histories of analytic philosophy and Deweyan pragmatism according to which the marginalization of Dewey’s pragmatism represents the sensible result of critical processes of reasoning. At the same time, however, the book also points out that Dewey and his analytic critics in fact share several worries and suggests that these common concerns might serve as points of reference for more fruitful dialogues across the traditions of analytic philosophy and Deweyan pragmatism in the future.