In The Pitfalls of Family Rule, Barbara Junisbai questions the conceptual divide separating democracy from non-democracy, as well as the conceptual divide separating "strong" authoritarian rulers from "weak" ones. Focusing on patronage, endemic to post-Soviet Eurasia, but also present the world over, she untangles the spoils agreements that bind elites to strong-man presidents. Incorporating multiple case studies, including an in-depth investigation into Kazakhstan over the span of 20-plus years, Junisbai demonstrates the power of institutional norms to hold seemingly un-constrainable rulers accountable in surprising and unexpected ways. "Strong" autocrats can stumble even when they set in place robust, pro-presidential institutions, while "weak" autocrats can endure by upholding normative contracts that elites perceive as fair and just. An important lesson emerges from this The Pitfalls of Family Rule: Not even the most personalist of regimes functions free of rules. The institutions that autocrats claim control over also lay claim over them.