The main debates in the philosophy of time have centred on whether A-theory, with events ordered by pastness, presentness and futurity, or B-theory, ordered by earlier than or later than, are equally fundamental. Emiliano Boccardi, L. Nathan Oaklander and Erwin Tegtmeier instead uphold the Russellian theory, or R-theory, and consider not only the fundament differences but also its superiority. They argue McTaggart’s misinterpretation of Russell has led to a false dichotomy between the A- and B-theories, while exploring the connection between temporal relations, temporal facts and time.
In defence of the R-theory, they argue how it offers a metaphysical explanation of the nature of time, in addition to investigating whether ontological theories of time can be considered from a moral or existential point of view. Using an ontological approach, this volume clarifies what is mistaken about both theories can only be resolved by adopting a Russellian philosophy, reaching beyond the A-theory vs B-theory debate.
Part I: What is the R-Theory?
Section A. Introduction to the R-theory
1. On the Difference between Temporal Ontology and the Ontology of Time
2. A Relational Ontology of Time
3. McTaggart’s Hidden Russellianism
Section B. The Direction of Time: A Debate
4. Time and Order
5. The Intrinsic Direction of Time
Part II: A Defense of the R-theory
Section C. Metaphysical Objections
6. The Intelligibility of the R-theory
7. The Distinguishability of A-, B- and R-theories
8. An R-theoretic Account of Change
Section D. Phenomenological Objections
1. Wishing it Were Some Other Time
2. Emotions and Psychological Attitudes on the R-theory
3. Is Presentism Ontologically or Morally Preferable than the R-theory?
Appendix
Bertrand Russell, “On the Experience of Time,” Monist, 25 (1915: 212-233).
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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